JOHN GARANG AND SUDANISM: A PECULIAR AND RESILIENT
NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY
By Matthew J. Delaney

Perspectives
Dialogue about John Garang and his Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) usually falls into two separate camps. One camp includes
many who tend to perceive Garang as a militaristic, power-hungry, dictatorial
leader who was not as concerned with democracy as he had claimed. Scholars
such as Sarah Hutchinson, Jok Madut Jok, John Young, Claire Metelits, Alex
de Waal, and Oystein H. Rolandsen discredit aspects of Garang’s movement
and ideology because of his human rights abuses and inability to implement
effective civil administrations in southern Sudan.
Mansour Khalid is of the second camp, and he most overtly supports
John Garang’s leadership and nationalist agenda. Abel Alier, M.W. Daly, and
Douglas Johnson also tend to sympathize with Garang and credit him with
having achieved effective civil administrations in the southern Sudan. They
perceive his democratic goals as mostly genuine, but they do not deny his
human rights abuses. However, they tend to address his autocratic behavior
objectively by trying to understand it in the context of the SPLA/M’s violent
and propagandistic opposition in Khartoum and among factions in the South.
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Francis M. Deng remains relatively neutral with regard to Garang’s success as a politician and as a defender of democracy. Garang plays a small
role in Deng’s argument that Sudan’s conflict since independence has been
a conflict of identity between the largely Arab north and the mostly African
south. Deng claims that long term peace in Sudan will not be realized until
the problem of the Sudanese identity is resolved. My exposition of Garang’s
nationalist ideology, Sudanism, is in agreement with Deng’s thesis, which is
that Sudan’s conflict is identity-driven.1 The purpose of this paper is to explain
Garang’s perspective of the Sudanese identity, which is embodied in his nationalist ideology, “Sudanism.”
Introduction
You, the people, in your popular uprising succeeded in cutting
off the monster’s head but the lifeless body continues to deceive
you that the monster is still dangerous. No, It is not! Having cut
off the monster’s head, it is your sacred duty to push down the
monster’s body, not stand in fear of it.2
These are the zealous words of Dr. John Garang de Mabior, Commanderin-Chief of the SPLA/M, in April of 1985. He was addressing the people of
Sudan after a recent popular people’s uprising, which overthrew the President of Sudan, Jaafar Nimeiri. Nimeiri was a voracious despot who was the
embodiment of the “monster’s head” in the opening quote. Garang did not
only necessitate the removal of the monster’s head, but also the destruction
of the body. The monster’s body is Nimeirism, which is a term that describes
the various policies and dictatorial, exploitative actions of President Nimeiri.
Nimeirism is a model of oppression against which John Garang pitted his ef1
Francis M. Deng is a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program at the Brookings
Institution and has served as the Sudan’s minister of state for foreign affairs, as its ambassador
to Canada, the United States, and Scandinavia. He is currently the Special Advisor to the UNSecretary General on the Prevention of Genocide.
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forts of liberation. In defiance of Nimeirism, Garang offered a new nationalist
ideology, which he called Sudanism, and which recognized the ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity of Sudan and called for a new, uniquely Sudanese
identity.3 Garang’s Sudanism was therefore inherently opposed to divisiveness
and separatism, and was disposed to unity. This thesis examines the conflicts
between Sudanism and Nimeirism, and Sudanism and secessionism in the
context of the second civil war in Sudan starting in 1983. In the following
pages I will argue that Garang remained consistent and persistent in heralding a new, united Sudan based on Sudanism, which was at heart a nationalist
ideology. Using James L. Gelvin’s model of the development and nature of
nationalisms I will demonstrate that Garang’s Sudanism was a peculiar form
of nationalism.4 I will describe his nationalist ideology in contrast to Nimeirism and secessionism.
NIMEIRISM VERSUS SUDANISM
John Garang defined Nimeirism as a policy of divide and rule that oppressed
the people of Sudan.5 He said that “the oppressor has divided the Sudanese
people into Northerners and Southerners; Westerners and Easterners...Muslims and Christians, and into Arabs and Africans.”6 According to Garang,
separatism, or sentiments among Southerners that called for secession from
the North, was a result of oppressive divide-and-rule tactics by the ruling elite.
The divisions reflected by the Nimeiri regime were meant to weaken the “just
cause” of the Sudanese people. Nimeiri had perpetuated the “neo-colonial
system” in which a “few people had amassed great wealth at the expense of
the majority;” the “few” being those of the “minority clique regime.”7 Garang
Garang, “Seminar with John Garang de Mabior at the Brokings Institution, Washington,
D.C. Friday, 9 June, 1989,” in Khalid Call for Democracy, 213..
4
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formally listed Nimeiri’s offenses against the Sudanese people and condemned
him for corruption, bribery, resource exploitation, and other forms of subjugation.8 Garang’s cardinal theme was that Nimeiri exploited and neglected
all Sudanese outside of the oligarchy of the Arab ruling elite with policies of
divide and rule, and by abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended
the first civil war in Sudan in 1972. He points out that Nimeiri wanted to
“deprive the South of mineral rich or prime agricultural land.”9 Garang boldly
condemned this resource exploitation and said that “natural resources, wherever they are found in the Sudan, belong to the whole Sudanese people.”10
This is readily applicable to the case of the Jonglei Canal, in which Khartoum
wanted to manipulate the canal in order to benefit Northern Sudan, making
the rest of Sudan a low priority. Similarly, Garang argued that Nimeiri promoted an Arab nationalism that showed exorbitant partiality to Arab Muslims
in Sudan. The full extension of this nationalism is seen in the implementation
of the “September Laws” of 1983, which obliged all Sudanese to abide by Islamic Shari’a law.11 Ultimately, in Garang’s perspective Nimeirism is a practice
of governance that keeps power in the hands of a few (Arab Northern elites) at
the expense of the masses.12 It is also inherently divisive and does not promote
unity among the many different ethnic groups of Sudan, but is exploitive and
oppressive.
In following James Gelvin’s argument about nationalism, we can conclude that Garang’s nationalist ideology was formed in response to Arab and
Islamic nationalist agendas in Sudan. Gelvin articulates that “all nationalisms
arise in opposition to some ‘other’” and that they are “defined by what they
oppose.”13 Sudanism is defined as the enemy of sectarian nationalisms, of
models of dictatorial rule such as Nimeirism, and of secessionism as we will
see later. Garang struggled against nationalist ideologies that sought to fetter
diverse Sudanese peoples to strictly Arab, African, Christian, or Islamic identiIbid., 20-1.
Ibid., 21.
10
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ties. Sudanism is among the many nationalist ideologies that “defined itself by
what it opposed.”
Nimeirism is the face of “sectarian chauvinism” and “religious bigotry.”14
According to Garang it created and perpetuated the suffering of Sudanese
civilians. Sudanism is the antithesis of Nimeirism, and it also contends against
separatism and heralds the unity of all Sudanese of every race, gender, religion,
and ethnicity. It recognizes that Sudan’s identity can be self-defined and established by the people.
In commenting on the formation of nation-states Garang said that the
British went to America and formed a new nation, and although Americans
have British origins they do not claim to be British, but American.15 He also
argued that “Argentineans speak Spanish and are Christians, but they are Argentineans not Spaniards and are proud of being Argentineans.”16 His point
was that Sudan can create its own “unique Sudanese civilization” or a “New
Sudan.”17 By asserting that Sudan can found its own national identity, Garang confirms Gelvin’s argument that nationalist movements create nations.18
Nationalist movements do not bring “preexisting nations to a state of selfawareness,” but they are the authors of their own, “imagined” nation-states.19
Garang elaborates on the problems in Sudan that are addressed in Sudanism and says that Sudan has “over 400 different ethnic groups” and that
although it is a “multi-nationality country” the Khartoum governments since
1956 have “treated the Sudan as a mono-nationality.”20 He further expounds
that Sudan is a multi-religious country, but Khartoum governments “favor
one religion, Islam,” which is fully expressed in the imposition of Shari’a law.21
According to Garang “nobody is anybody’s minority and nobody is anybody’s
14
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majority. We are all Sudanese, full stop.”22 He believed that the union of Sudan’s numerous ethnicities, cultures, and religions eliminated the concept of
a minority. Everyone had equal representation and everyone was a majority.
From this perspective there was no “southern problem,” because if there was a
problem for anyone in Sudan, no matter what region, then it was the problem
of all Sudanese. Garang’s Sudanism arduously struggled to create a New Sudan
“in which all nationalities and all religious groups coexisted.” Arabs, Africans,
Christians, Muslims, Dinka, and Nuer are all united under Sudanism, and
none is valued above the other.24 The unity of diverse people groups is fundamental to Sudanism. Garang could have given his alliance to a southernSudanese nationalism, or a Dinka nationalism, or something of the like, but
he did not offer such submission. This makes his nationalist ideology peculiar
and distinguishable from other ideologies in Sudan.
It is especially peculiar when analyzed in juxtaposition to Gelvin’s argument about Zionism and Jewish nationalism. Gelvin claims that Jews needed
their own “homeland” as a result of the anti-Semitism that they faced in Europe and Russia, and that Zionism called for Jews around the world to “embrace the idea that they constitute a single nation, united as in the case of all
nations, by the ties and travails of history.”25 Garang was categorized as a black
“African” from the Dinka ethnic group. In recent history Africans have been
marginalized and categorized as inferior to other ethnic groups such as Arabs
and Europeans. Zionism is, in part, formed in response to Jewish marginalization and exclusion. However, unlike Zionism, Garang’s nationalist ideology
did not seek to unite all “Africans,” but included all peoples within the Sudanese territory, including Arabs. Zionism does not do this, but instead unites
all Jews, observant and nonobservant alike. It does not invite other non-Jewish
people groups to be a part of its nation. This is what makes Sudanism distinct
from other more universal nationalist ideologies such as Arabism and Zionism. It is very much its own in that it sought to unite many different people
Garang, “Response of John Garang to Dr. El-Gizouli, 1 September 1985,” in Khalid Call
for Democracy, 92.
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groups within Sudan, and to include even those of the Arab ruling elites who
had historically sought to unite Sudan according to Arabism in a discriminatory way.
ORIGINS OF SUDANISM
In Sudan’s history we can trace the overt progression of the Arab/Islamic identity, and the gradual neglect and exclusion of the south. Garang recognized
that the current racial disparities and class distinctions between northern Arabs and southern Africans were a result of historical development. The current
divisions between Arabs and everyone else in Sudan took centuries to come
to fruition, and have firm historical roots. Francis M. Deng, a former UN
Secretary General for internally-displaced persons and an expert on Sudan,
suggests that Anglo-Egyptian colonial policy in Sudan exacerbated these divisions, and that ultimately, these divisions led to the first civil war in Sudan in
the 1950s.26 Garang took up arms against an unyielding division between the
north and the south with his vision for a united Sudan. He claimed that “since
[independence] a small parasitic clique from the pre-independence system of
exploitation took over the former instruments of oppression for their own
interests and against the wishes of the majority of the Sudanese people.”27
Garang points out a “neo-colonialism” at work in Sudan that had adopted the oppressive policies of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule in
the form of a “domestic colonialism.”28 He used Sudanism as an opposing
force against the colonial legacy left by the Anglo-Egyptians and against the
domestic colonialism of the northern Arabs. The development of the Sudanese identity under the “Arab hegemony” was quite apparent to Garang. He
conceded that Sudan’s “major problem was that it had been looking and was
still looking for its soul, for its true identity.”29 Therefore, Garang offered a
new identity for Sudan that did not promote the exploitation or discriminaDeng, 134..
“Sudanese Rebel Leader’s Appeal to the People,” Text of appeal, with introduction Radio
SPLA in English (1300 gmt 10 Nov 84), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4 The Middle
East, Africa and Latin America; A. THE MIDDLE EAST; ME/7800/A1 (November 14, 1984).
28
Garang, “Statement by John Garang de Mabior at…Koka Dam, 20 March 1986,” in Khalid
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29
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tion of any races, ethnicities, or religions. Sudanism is adamant about equality
because Sudanese history has constantly witnessed the aggrandizement of the
Arab race alongside the exploitation and neglect of other races, especially of
southern Africans. It is peculiar that Garang should seek to unite two groups
of people who had become so blatantly dichotomized. The Arab-African division has grown worse over many centuries, along with the development of the
Arab ruling elite in the north who have neglected the southern Sudanese. This
should cause us to wonder why Garang did not initially support a nationalist ideology that favored separatism and self-determination for the southern
Sudanese.
Garang’s response to this was that “the oppressor,” which represented
any ruling party or person in the Sudan that had oppressed and exploited the
masses, had “time and again played various politics in order to destroy and
weaken the just struggle of our people, including that most historic policy of
divide and rule.”30 It is clear that Garang judged secessionism as a perpetuation of divisiveness in Sudan that had only served to weaken the Sudanese
people, not empower them. Garang clearly articulated this view when he said
that “it was therefore natural that secessionist movements…developed in different periods in different areas of Sudan thereby jeopardizing the unity of the
people and prolonging their suffering and struggle.”31 Secessionism is a manifestation of the inherent “divide and rule” tactics of the oppressor. It does not
help the cause for peace and prosperity of the exploited Sudanese, but actually
weakens their struggle and “prolongs their suffering.”32
Garang heralded a nationalist ideology that opposed secessionism with
the same zeal as it opposed the minority clique regimes. He made this undeniably clear when he said that “if anybody wants to separate even in the north,
we will fight him because the Sudan must be one. It should not be allowed to
disintegrate or fragment itself.”33 He describes Sudanese unity as something
to be achieved within a piece of real estate that we call Sudan, but that has
territorial boundaries delineated by the British. Using Gelvin’s model, clearly
“Sudanese Rebel Leader’s Appeal to the People.”
Ibid., 19.
32
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Garang was “inventing the notion that a population used to exist” in Sudan
that had a “common interest” and that this united population should not be
allowed to “fragment itself.”34 Garang’s commitment to the unity of the invented Sudanese “nation” was ceaseless. Sudanism has absolutely no tolerance
for secessionism of any kind. Both minority clique regimes, which are embodied by Nimeirism, and secessionism are enemies of Sudanism.
SOUTHERN SEPARATISTS VERSUS GARANG AND SUDANISM
Garang’s unyielding determination for Sudanese unity, and his intolerance
of secessionism, galvanized much factionalism among the SPLA leaders and
other southern Sudanese. The SPLA-Nasir faction was a prominent, southern
rebel faction among others that opposed Garang’s SPLA/M on ideological
grounds. The Nasir faction was formed in August of 1991 when two former
members of the High Command of the SPLA, Riek Machar and Lam Akol,
issued a radio message that called for the removal of Garang from leadership.35
Initially Machar and Akol blamed their defection from the SPLA/M on the
dictatorial leadership of Garang,36 and on the accusation that Garang committed countless human rights abuses against SPLA/M members.37 However, on
January 24, 1992, the SPLA/M Nasir faction expressed their goals for southern self-determination and the separation of the south from the north.38 The
Nasir faction did not endorse Sudanism, and saw the hope for a united Sudan
as unrealistic.39 Issues of ideology were fundamental to factional movements
against the SPLA/M.
At a delegation between Lam Akol and the Nasir faction with the Nigerian Government, it was proposed that “secession is the will of the Southern people and Garang knows this very well.” It was concluded that Garang’s
movement was “doomed” because it did not reflect the goals and “aspirations”
of the southern people.41 There was a real fervency against Garang’s mission
Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict, 17.
Dr. Lam Akol, SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2003), 12.
36
Ibid., 306.
37
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39
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40
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for a united Sudan based on Sudanism. We see bold condemnation of Garang’s nationalist ideology, and claims against him that said he was not representing the will of the people, but was instead promoting a self-interested
agenda. According to Gelvin, this would invalidate Sudanism because in this
instance it would not reflect the “common interest” of the people whom it was
attempting to unite.42 Garang faced much opposition from southern separatists, which resulted in manifold human rights violations and the slaughter of
innocent civilians by all parties involved. Sudanism could not co-exist with
separatist ideologies, and this is reflected in the violent conflict between Garang’s SPLA/M, the Nasir faction and other southern factions.
There are claims against Garang’s unity stance, as mentioned earlier, that
posit that the sentiment of the southern people was for secession and self-determination. Therefore, separatists concluded that Garang was not fighting for
the “common interest” of the Sudanese people. In the 1990s, there was much
pressure put on Garang to renounce his position for a united Sudan, and to
concede to self-determination and secession for the South. This would have
inevitably forfeited the implementation of Sudanism. Scholars tend to agree
that the unity policy was important for causing factionalism.43 Further, there
is overwhelming unanimity among scholars regarding the southern sentiment
toward secession. Most acknowledge that the majority of southerners favored
secession rather than a united Sudan, and that they fought under Garang
with this underlying sentiment in their hearts.44 Obviously Lam Akol agreed
with scholars and claimed that the “Southern Sudanese received the call for a
United Sudan with great skepticism and finally total rejection.”45
42
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There is a strong case to be made for this reality, because it is hard to
understand why there was so much factionalism and internal, violent southern conflict unless Garang was, in fact, not representing the political goals
and hopes of the southern Sudanese people. Although Garang claimed to be
fighting on behalf of all of Sudan, not just the south, it is important to mention the south because this is the group that has faced much of the historical
exploitation by the north. The south comprises many of the oppressed peoples
for whose liberation Garang claimed to fight. Therefore, if Garang did not
represent the sentiment of the southern people then his movement was not for
the “common good” of all. Obviously there were other reasons that fueled and
perpetuated southern factional conflict, but ideology played a prominent role.
Ultimately, if Sudanism did not reflect the majority sentiment of the
marginalized people of Sudan, then it seems that it was a self-interested nationalist ideology. It was not a valid nationalism according to Gelvin if it did
not reflect the “common interest” of the Sudanese populace. Sudanism was
not a legitimate movement of liberation if it was only favorable to one ethnic
group in Sudan. It was futile and unreflective of southern aspirations if the
“excluded” people of Sudan favored secessionism, and not unity.
SOUTHERN SENTIMENT: UNITY OR SECESSION?
It is difficult to attach a specific figure to the southern will for secession during
the 1980s and 1990s. However, the true, contemporary southern sentiment
regarding secession was recently unveiled in the referendum vote in January 2011. The final count showed that of the 3.8 million registered voters in
southern Sudan, 98.83% voted in favor of seceding from the north.46 There
is overwhelming unanimity in favor of secession in the south, which causes
us to question Garang’s commitment to the “common interests” of the southern Sudanese. Garang was an out-spoken opponent of secession, and in this
regard he was in disagreement with most of the people for whom he claimed
to fight. The southern sentiment for secession may have been strong during
the Garangian era, but at that time it was not a point of enough contention
“Sudan,” New York Times, February 8, 2011, under “World,” http://topics.nytimes.
com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/sudan/index.html?scp=1&sq=sudan%20
referendum&st=cse (accessed April 6, 2011).
46
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to oust Garang from his position of Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA/M.
Despite what may have been unanimous secessionist sentiments, Garang remained consistent and persistent with his goals for a united New Sudan, while
Riek Machar and Lam Akol seem to have compromised their objectives and
the objectives of liberation for the southern Sudanese.
In a radio message to all units of the SPLA on August 28th, 1991,
Machar and Akol spoke untruthfully when they claimed that Garang had
been “deposed” as the Chairman of the SPLA/M and that Riek Machar would
“take over as the interim leader until a National Convention was called to elect
the leader of the Movement.”47 The reality is that Garang was not deposed and
that he remained the leader of the SPLA/M. Machar and Akol’s declaration
against Garang did result in the creation of a new southern faction and did
have some popularity, but it did not have the restructuring effect for which
they had hoped. Secession was not an issue of such importance at that time
that it was cause for Garang’s removal. Even though Garang was not deposed,
we cannot neglect the fact that Garang did not seem to reflect the “common
interest” of the southern people with regard to secession. This further confirms
the peculiarity of Sudanism, and causes us to question Garang’s unyielding
commitment to unity when so many of his followers advocated separation.
Nonetheless, the secessionist will of the Nasir faction was not strong enough
to overthrow Garang even though it weakened the movement by resulting
in brutal conflict between southern factions and in the wanton slaughter of
thousands of civilians.
After unsuccessfully attempting to overthrow Garang, Machar and Akol
began to collude with the Khartoum government and received government
military support to combat Garang’s SPLA-Torit.48 The government also
sponsored other anti-Garang groups such as the Anyanya II and Arab militias
militarily in order to weaken Garang’s movement.49 The Nasir faction, the
Anyanya II movement, and the Arab militias such as the Murhallin, all committed inhumane atrocities against Sudanese civilians, especially against the
Akol, 12.
SPLA-Torit is another name given to Garang’s faction of the SPLA Movement. Sam Kiley,
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49
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Dinka.50 One of the most notorious acts of atrocious violence against civilians
by government-sponsored Arab militias was the massacre of approximately
1,500 Dinka civilians in the town of Al-Daein in 1987.51 Amnesty International accused Machar’s Nasir faction in 1993 of killing approximately 2,000
Dinka.52
Garang’s SPLA also had a record of human rights abuses, although it
was less egregious than that of the government-funded southern factions and
militias. I point out the atrocities of the Nasir faction in order to show that
Machar and Akol initially opposed Garang because of his dictatorial and inhumane leadership, and because he did not support the true secessionist goals
of the Sudanese masses.
Yet, soon after its origin, the Nasir faction began receiving military
support from the government, and then committed heinous human rights
abuses against southern Sudanese civilians. The Nasir faction especially targeted Dinka civilians because of their association with Garang, who was also
a Dinka and had been accused by some as leading a movement that was seeking Sudanese domination by the Dinka.53 Dinka civilians were also targeted
by the Arab militias employed by the government, as is seen in the Al-Daein
massacre of 1987.
Why is it that the Nasir faction claimed to fight on behalf of the secessionist sentiments of southerners and their liberation, but also colluded with
an oppressive government and massacred Dinka civilians? Were the Dinka
people so unanimously pro-Garang that the Nasir faction felt it necessary
to slaughter them in order to accomplish secessionist goals for the suffering
Sudanese?
Machar’s Nasir faction was not alone in its human rights abuses. Garang’s SPLA also committed its share of human rights violations against suffering Sudanese civilians and dissenters within the SPLA, which obviously
50
Human Rights Watch Report/Africa (formerly Africa Watch), Civilian Devastation: Abuses
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51
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52
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perpetuated the conflict between the Nasir faction and Garang.54 However, if
the oppressed people of Sudan were so anti-Garang and so pro-secession, then
the Nasir faction would not have needed to garner abundant military support
from the “minority clique regime” and massacre civilians in order to defeat
Garang. There may have been substantial pro-secessionist aspirations among
the southern Sudanese, but anti-Garang sentiments were not as prominent
as Machar and Akol had claimed. This does not mean that Garang reflected
the majority sentiment of the marginalized Sudanese, but it does mean that
he had enough support to remain the leader of the dominant rebel army in
Sudan.
There were two reasons for the collusion of the Nasir faction with the
Khartoum government. The first is that the Nasir faction lacked the resources
and the popularity to overthrow Garang, and therefore had to acquire government support. Secondly, as is widely accepted, the Khartoum government
continually instigated Nasir-Torit conflict and used the Nasir faction to weaken the whole Sudanese rebel movement.55 This confirms Garang’s theory that
the “oppressor” constantly sought to “divide and rule” the Sudanese people to
their demise. The government supported the Nasir faction in order to divide
and subjugate the whole rebel cause. Garang must have despised the Nasir
faction’s adultery against the Sudanese people as they slept with the enemy in
Khartoum.
Ultimately, we can, at the very least, conclude that Garang was fervent
and unyielding in his pursuit of Sudanism. While adamant secessionists such
as Machar and Akol compromised their own objectives and colluded with the
“oppressor” to the detriment of countless civilians, Garang remained consistent about achieving a new, united Sudan that was democratic and that did
not discriminate based on race, religion, or culture, and that redefined the
Sudanese identity. However, Garang’s hope for a united Sudan could not succeed in the midst of overwhelming support for secession among southerners.

Human Rights Watch Report/Africa 1994, 3.
Hutchinson, “A Curse from God,” 310; Hutchinson and Jok Madut Jok, 130; Sam Kiley,
“Khartoum Supplying Guns to Inflame Rebel Infighting.” The southern faction led by Riek
Machar and Lam Akol was referred to as the “Nasir” faction, and John Garang’s movement was
referred to as the “Torit” faction. Khartoum gave military support to the Nasir faction in order to
weaken Garang’s movement.
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CONCLUSION
Using James L. Gelvin’s argument about nationalist ideologies, which claims
that nations are created by nationalists and that nationalisms must promote
the “common interest” of the populations of the nations they create, we have
traced the development of John Garang’s nationalist ideology, Sudanism. It
is defined in opposition to Garang’s idea of Nimeirism, which is an ideology
that does not include the “excluded” and that does not unite all of the ethnic
groups, religions, and cultures within the territorial boundaries of Sudan. Sudanism also opposes secessionism much in the same way that Zionism opposes dissension among Jews who refute the idea of global Jewish unity. Garang
remained consistent and persistent in his pursuit of his nationalist agenda, and
hoped for a united Sudan and for a new, distinctly Sudanese identity.
To the great tragedy of those who shared Garang’s optimism, and who
trusted in him to implement a viable peace for the “excluded” Sudanese, Garang was killed in a helicopter crash on a flight from Uganda to southern
Sudan on the weekend of July 31, 2005.56 The excluded people of Sudan have
spoken, and it seems that Sudanism and the hope for a united Sudan has
perished with Garang. The true sentiment of the southern Sudanese people
is for secession, and in this current era it seems doubtful that Sudanism will
ever be realized. Even if Sudanism did not reflect the secessionist interests of
the southern peoples, we are still left to wonder if Dr. John Garang de Mabior
pushed down the monster’s body, the body of Nimeirism, or if the monster
still stands. Is the monster falling down or is it lifting itself up, only to ruin
the hope of Sudan? It is the people who removed the monster’s head in the
first place, and it will be the people who decide what becomes of its body. Sudanism, in its entirety, will not be the sword with which Nimeirism is permanently slain, but whatever the sword may be, it will be the people who wield it.
May they wield this sword in unity and “dig out a mountain with shovels!”57
56
Marc Lacey, “New No. 2 in Sudan, an Ex-Rebel Leader, Dies in a Copter Crash,” New York
Times, Aug. 1, 2005.
57
Quote by John Garang on 26 and 27 May 1985 on Second Anniversary of the Bor, Pibor
and Fashalla resistance and Ayod revolt. It is meant to signify the power of Sudanese unity. He
says “all reactionary and clique regimes in Khartoum must know that when the people are united
and resolved they can dig out a mountain with shovels, let alone the May II regime with is much
weaker than May I.”; Garang, “Statement by John Garang on 26 and 27 May 1985” in Khalid
Call for Democracy, 52.
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